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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
vs. Plaintiff, 
HAROLD A. CARLSON AND 
M. E. HARRIS, Jll., Defendants . 












NATURE OF CASE 
The only action before the court is a suit by M. E. 
Harris, Jr., a professional architect to foreclose a me-
chanic's lien for architectural services as to the land-
owner, Zions Securities Corporation. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
After pre-trial and trial before the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen, District Judge, a judgment and de-
cree was entered in favor of lH. E. Harris, Jr., against 
Zions Securities Corporation foreclosing Harris' me-
chanic's lien. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks aff irmance of the findings, con-
clusions and decree entered by the trial court. 
STATEiYIENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts is unsatisfactory be-
cause it is neither complete nor entirely accurate. 
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Respondent, 1\1. E. Harris, Jr., was and is a li-
censed architect in the State of Utah, qualified to render 
professional architectural services in the state. ( R. 177) 
Harris and one Harold Carlson, a licensed California 
architect, were commissioned as joint venturers by Art-
col Corporation to prepare complete plans and specifi-
cations for the construction of a multi-storied apartment 
building on the block bounded by South Temple, First 
Avenue and "A" Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 
178 and 179) The contract called for payment of a flat 
fee of $212,350.00, but in the event work should be 
stopped, for 75% of that sum after the plans and speci-
fications had been prepared. (Pl. Ex. 2) It was stipu-
lated at the trial that if Harris should prevail, he is en-
titled to judgment in the sum of 75% of $212,350.00, 
or $159,262.50, together with interest thereon and rea-
sonable attorney's fees in the sum of 10% of said princi-
pal and interest. ( R. 220 and 221) 
All of the work performed was under the super-
vision of Harris. ( R. 202) Carlson assigned to Harris 
all of his right, title and interest in the contract and 
mechanic's lien, subsequently filed. (Pl. Ex. 1) To pay 
for the cost of preparing the plans and specifications, 
Harris and Carlson borrowed $90,000.00 from Zions 
First National Bank, which entire sum was expended 
for employees, draftsmen, engineers, and materials and 
which obligation was secured by an assignment of the 
Artcol contract to Zions Bank. (Pl. Ex. 3) Over a period 
of many months, Harris and Carlson prepared prelim-
inary sketches, plans, specifications, engineering studies, 
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topographic studies, renderings, surveys, material lists, 
FHA applications, zoning applications, soil tests, site 
clearing and all of the things necessary to complete the 
plans and specifications for the apartment building. (Pl. 
Exs. 4 through 16) The FHA approved construction 
of the apartment building and issued an FHA insured 
commitment on the construction loan. ( R. 17 4) 
Prior to Harris' employment, Zions Securities had 
given Artcol an option to lease the property in question 
for the purpose of building the apartment. (Pl. Ex. 20) 
Zions Securities purchased the property with the 
thought in mind that it would be used for a mission 
home or type of building that would be useful to the 
church, but thereafter abandoned that plan and gave 
Artcol an option to later obtain a lease for the purpose 
of developing the property with an apartment building. 
(R. 207, 208 and 218) Zions Securities had owned the 
property for approximately eight years prior to the 
lease to Artcol and during said period it had remained 
vacant, except for a home thereon which produced 
$100.00 a month rental. (R. 221) 
Artcol exercised the option and Zions Securities 
leased the property to Artcol with the intention that the 
building would be constructed. (Pl. Ex. 21) ( R. 208) 
Mr. Doxey, the Manager of Zion Securities, testified, 
"As I say, there was no question but what the 
intent was that they were proposing and plan-
ning to build a building. That was the only in-
terest they had in it." ( R. 208) 
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The lease is entirely predicated upon the building 
of the apartment. It is interesting to note that Appellant 
attaches as an appendix to its brief excerpts from Ex-
hibit 21, the lease, and omits portions which support 
Respondent's position. For example, Appellant omits 
paragraph 2 of the lease that requires joint appraisals 
of the land and building, each year, by Zions and Artcol 
for the purposes of determining rentals. Paragraph 5 
is omitted and provides that the building shall become 
and remain the property of Zions. Paragraph 6 is 
omitted which gives Zions the building in the event of 
termination of the lease and requires Artcol to deliver 
the building "in as good as condition as when such build-
ing or buildings ... are completed, reasonable wear and 
tear ... excepted." Paragarph 11 requiring Artcol to 
keep the buildings insured against fire and other loss 
for the benefit of Zions Securities is omitted. 
The lease calls for a minimum of $18,000.00 a year, 
increasing to $36,000.00 a year or sums in excess thereof, 
based upon the appraised value of the land and the 
apartment after completion. Zions received $1,000.00 at 
the time of entering into the option, $54,000.00 at the 
time of entering into the lease, and in excess of 
$18,000.00 for rental during the period of the prepara-
tion of the plans and specifications, together with real 
property taxes during said period in the sum of 
$3,464.00 (Pl. Ex. 24) (R. 210-212) The lease further 
regulates the use of the premises, such as prohibiting the 
consumption of beer or intoxicating liquors (p. 3), re-
quires the construction to meet architectural standards 
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(p. 4), requires that the improvement should revert to 
Zions at the expiration of the lease (p. 4), requires the 
building to be insured for the benefit of the lessor (p. 
6), requires Artcol's covenant that it will not permit 
liens to be filed with respect to said building, but allows 
Artcol to test the validity of liens filed (p. 8), gives 
Zions a lien upon all the personal property within the 
building (p. 10), authorizes Artcol to finance the build-
ing with FHA insured money (p. 13), sets up an elab-
orate formula among lessor, lessee and FHA in the 
event of condemnation (p. 13) and provides: 
"The LANDLORD agrees that, within ten 
(IO) days after receipt of written request from 
TEN ANT, it will join in any and all applications 
for permits, licenses or other authorizations re-
quired by any governmental or other body claim-
ing jurisdiction in connection with any work 
which the TENANT may do hereunder, and 
will also join in any grants for easements for elec-
tric, telephone, gas, water, sewer and such other 
public utilities and facilities as may be reasonably 
necessary in the operation of the demised prem-
ises or of any improvements that may be erected 
thereon; and if, at the expiration of such ten ( 10) 
days' period, the LANDLORD shall not have 
joined in any such application, or grants for 
easements, the TENANT shall have the right 
to execute such application and grants in the 
name of the LANDLORD, and, for that pur-
pose, the LANDLORD hereby irrevocabl;IJ ap-
points the TEN ANT as its Attorney-in-fact to 
e,recute such papers on behalf of the LAND-
LORD." (emphasis added) 
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After Harris had substantially completed the pre-
liminary sketches, he met with the manager of Zions 
Securities, l\Ir. Doxey, at the request of Artcol and dis-
cussed the preliminary sketches with him in detail and 
received his approval of same. ( R. 183, 184) Mr. Doxey 
of Zions Securities executed all applications for zoning 
variances and either he or J.Vlr. Merrill of Zions Securi-
ties, appeared with l\Ir. Harris at zoning hearings and 
enthusiastically urged the approval of Harris' plans pre-
sented to the zoning board and the construction of the 
building. (PL Exs. 5 to 8) Mr. Doxey, at one zoning 
hearing testified in substance as follows: 
"Mr. Doxey explained his interest is second-
ary. This _property is not easy to develop with its 
slopes and position in relation to First Avenue 
and South Temple. They are happy with this 
proposal, because it makes it possible for an ex-
pensive piece of land to be put into an economic 
use. The fact they have added fifty percent more 
off-street parking than is required is evidence of 
excellent planning. He felt this project would be 
a great contribution to the community. Zions 
Securities Corporation is very much in favor of 
this development on the basis as proposed. They 
feel the very small request of change in recog-
nizing the sidewalk instead of the property line 
in this instance on a one-way street, a street of 
little traffic, would not be difficult to grant from 
the standpoint of variance because of the par-
ticular facts that surrounded this situation. 'Vhen 
asked the terms of the lease, Mr. Doxey ex-
plained it is for fifty-five years." 
"l\ir. Doxey pointed out that there has to be 
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some development 011 this corner if the city is 
going to grow, and the corner cannot be de-
veloped with its cost unless some substantial 
building is built on it, and a substantial building 
is going to increase the parking. To him it seemed 
unlikely that A Street with its contours will ever 
be changed to any other than a one-way street. 
So the requested variance on A Street would 
seem equitable. Height is something the Board 
has wrestled with for a long time and it is such a 
problem in the modern development of Salt Lake 
City that changes have been made in the ordi-
nance. The request came well within the change 
that will be made before long. He noted that the 
parking inside the building would be an asset and 
also that th<i parking far exceeds that which is 
required. "\Vhen the chairman asked if this is a 
definite lease, Mr. Doxey stated: 'The lease is a 
firm lease and the money has been paid'." (R. 
214, 215) 
l\fr. Doxey reaffirmed this position in letters to the 
Zoning Board. (Pl. Ex. 22 and 23) 
Soil tests were made on the property and the exist-
ing building was demolished and removed therefrom, 
all as part of the program, and with the knowledge and 
implied consent of Zions Securities. (R. 217) 
The construction loan was never obtained and the 
project was abandoned, primarily by reason of the death 
of the principal officer of Artcol Corporation. (R. 204) 
Harris was paid nothing for his services in preparing 
the complete plans and specifications for the building. 
( R. 204) l-larris thereupon caused to be filed with the 
County Recorder, his notice of intention to claim a lien, 
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(Pl. Ex. 19) and thereafter when Zions First National 
Bank commenced action upon the $90,000.00 notes, 
Harris, by a third party complaint, sought to foreclose 
his lien against Zions Securities Corporation, and was 
granted judgment on his third party complaint, from 




UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUM-
STANCES HERIN, THE LIEN OF THE AR-
CHITECT HARRIS ATTACHED TO THE IN-
TEREST OF THE LESSOR, ZIONS SECURI-
TIES CORPORATION. 
Points 1, 2 and 4 of Appellant's brief all effectively 
<leal with the issue of whether or not the lien, attached 
to the interest of the lessor, Zions Securities Corpora-
tion. Respondent, therefore, will answer all three of 
Appellant's points hereunder. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 38-1-3, express-
ly gives a lien to "licensed architects and engineers and 
artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or 
superintendence, or who have rendered other like pro-
fessional service or bestowed labor." 
The statute further provides that the architect 
"shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning 
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which they have rendered service * * * whether at the 
instance of the owner or of any other person acting by 
his authority as agent, contractor or otherwise." 
There is no question but that an architect is en-
titled to a mechanic's lien, see lleadlund v. Daniels, 50 
Utah 381, 167 Pac. 1170, (1917), and that the lien ex-
tends to his services in furnishing plats, plans, maps, 
etc. Frehner v. Morton, 18 U.2d 422, 424 P.2d 446 
(1967). 
Early Utah cases suggested that a lessor's interest 
was not !)Ubject to a lien with respect to improvements 
contracted for by the tenant unless the relation of prin-
cipal and agent existed between the lessor and lessee. 
See Morrow v. Merritt, 16 Utah 412, 52 Pac. 667 
( 1898); Belnap v. Condon, 34 Utah 219, 97 Pac. Ill 
( 1908). Even under the early cases, however, it was 
clear that the agency could be express or implied, or by 
subsequent ratification. These cases, however, construed 
an earlier Utah mechanic's lien statute which contained 
a provision that the lien should attach only to such in-
terest as the owner or "lessee" may have in the real 
estate. The words "or lessee" have been deleted from the 
present statute. 
A later case under the old statute suggests that 
where the lease agreement requires that the lessee make 
stipulated improvements, an agency will arise for the 
purposes of making those improvements. See Gorman 
v. Birrell, 41 Utah 274, 125 Pac. 685 (1912). Although 
the lease per se does not require the construction of the 
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apartment building, the whole purpose and intention of 
the lease was in contemplation of the building of the 
apartment house. The lease requires architectural stand-
ards to be conformed to in the building of the apartment 
house. The rental ultimately is based upon the value of 
the improvement built. The apartment house reverts to 
the lessor at the end of the lease. The lease contains re-
strictive provisions with respect to the use of the apart-
ment house. The lease requires insurance upon the apart-
ment building for the benefit of the lessor. The lease 
contemplates the filing of liens and requires the tenant 
to save the landlord harmless therefrom. The lease gives 
the landlord a lien upon the furniture and fixtures to be 
placed in the apartment building. And, finally, by the 
lease, the landlord agrees to join in all necessary appli-
cations for building permits, licenses, et cetera, and "for 
that purpose, the landlord hereby irrevocably appoints 
the tenants as its attorney-in-fact to execute such papers 
011 behalf of the landlord." 
In fact, it is generally accepted law in most juris-
dictions that where the lease contemplates the construc-
tion of a building which will enhance the value of the 
fee to the benefit of the lessor, the lessee must be deemed 
the agent of the lessor for the purpose of the construc-
tion. See annotation 87 A.L.R. 1290. See Myers v. 
Joseph A. Strowbridge Company, 82 Ore. 29, 160 Pac. 
13.5; Oregon Lumber Company v. Nolan, 75 Ore. 69, 
143 Pac. 935; Denniston Company v. Brown, 183 Iowa 
3!)8, 167 N.,iV. 190; Loeff v. Myer, 284 Ill. 114, 119 
N.E. 908; Long-Bell Lumber Company v. McCray 
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Bank Company, 89 Kan. 788, 132 Pac. 992; English v. 
Olympic Auditorium, 20 P.2d 946; Ott Hardware Com-
pany v. Yost, 69 Cal. App. 2d 593, 159 P.2d 663. 
Further, the parties to the lease cannot circumvent 
liens by provision of the lease. See Metals Manufacturer 
Company v. The Banh of Commerce, 16 U.2d 74, 395 
P.2d 914, wherein this court construing the bonding 
statute to protect materialmen (U.C.A., 1953, 14-2-1 
and 2), a comparable statute to the mechanic's lien stat-
ute, allowed a material supplier to recover against the 
leasee even though the terms of an agreement between 
the lessee and the lessor stated that the improvements 
made to the building would remain personal property 
and could be removed by the lessee at the end of the 
lease. This court stated: 
"It would seem to be unrealistic and unreason-
able to conclude that such parties by agreement 
among themselves could bind third party sup-
pliers of materials to the terms of an agreement 
to which such suppliers were not privies and the 
terms of which they do not know. Such conclu-
sion could result in easy circumvention of the 
statute whose purpose clearly is to protect sup-
pliers, if what they supply falls within the clear 
import of the statute." 
In Robert L. 1Veed Architect Inc. v. Horning, 33 
So. 2nd 648 (Fla. 1948) , facts remarkably similar to the 
instant case, the architect executed a contract with the 
under a lease which contemplated improvements 
and which contained an identical provision to the lease 
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herein, whereby the lessee agreed not to allow any me-
chanic's liens to be placed upon the land and the land 
owner contended this defeated the lien. The Florida 
Court stated: 
"To rebut the latter contention, it is sufficient 
to say that the original lease provided for the 
improvements on the lease-hold from which Ap-
pellant's lien accrued, both parties knew they 
were essential to execute the purpose of the lease 
and both parties knew that they were the very 
gist of the lease. When the lease is read in sum 
one can draw no other conclusion than that both 
parties contemplated and knew that a contract 
for the improvements would be made. Appellant 
was not a party to the lease and since the statute 
gives him a lien, it would be ridiculous to hold 
that the parties to the lease can contract to defeat 
the law." 
The Indiana Court in American Islam Society vs. 
Bob Ulrich Decorating, 132 N.E. 2d. 620 (Ind. 1956) 
stated: 
"Something more than mere inactive consent is 
necessary in order that a lien may be acquired 
against the owner of the property. But where 
the vendor has been active and in 
having the improvements made, the lien will pt-
tach to the real estate where the vendee failed to 
carry out his contract of purchase. * * * The lien 
may attach if the owner of the real estate has been 
active and instrumental in having the improve-
ments made. If there is such evidence then under 
the well-recognized rules, this court will not 
weigh the evidence and reverse the finding of the 
trial court upon a disputed question of fact. * * * 
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"The lessor's interest * * * may be subject to 
a mechanic's lien by reason of the lessee's cou-
tract where the lease contemplates the makillg 
of improvements by the lessee, especially where 
such improvements are a substantial benefit to 
the lessor, as well as where the lessee obligates 
himself to make improvements at his own ex-
pense. * * * 
"It is the general rule that where a lease cou-
tains a provision authorizing the lessee to make 
improvements 'by deducting the costs thereof 
from the rent, or where part of the consideration 
of the lease is the making by the lessee of im-
provements which became a part of the realty. 
or that the improvements made by the lessee shall 
revert to the lessor, a mechanic's lien may attach 
to the property for work done or materials fur-
nished, pursuant to a contract with the lessee'." 
A number of the cases cited by Zions are from strict 
construction states, such as Iowa. The most that can be 
said for these cases, as well as the Utah Case of Belnap 
v. Condon, supra, is that something more than mere 
consent is required to subject the title of the fee owner 
to the lien. 
As aptly stated by the Supreme Court of l\Iissouri: 
"\Vhile the lease should, if such connection 
exists, sufficiently disclose the lessor's finger 
prints on same, it is not upon this instrument 
alone, howe,·er, but to all the facts connected 
with the transaction that we mav look in deter-
mining whether a connection the nature of 
agency exists hehveen the parties and as a 
quence the right of the respondents to the hens. 
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Allen Estate Association v. Boeke, 300 Mo. 575, 
254 S.\V. 858 (1923). 
In addition to the fingerprints of the lessor on the 
lease herein, the singular evidence is that the lessor ac-
tively participated in the development and improvement 
of its real property and impliedly authorized and ratified 
the employment of Harris, and subjected itself to Har-
ris' architect's lien. Under the circumstances surround-
ing the development of Zions property, it had adequate 
means to protect itself from claims of unpaid laborers 
and materialmen. It sought to protect itself by requiring 
Artcol to covenant that no liens would be filed against 
the property, but all Zions had to do was to require Art-
col to obtain a bond, saving Zions harmless from lien 
claims. 
"The aim and purpose of the Utah Mechanic's 
Lien Law (38-1-1 - 38-1-26, U.C.A., 1953) 
manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, 
those who perform the labor and furnish the ma-
terials which enter into the construction of a 
building or other improvement. The owner of the 
premises is most likely to suffer." Rio Grande 
Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 Pac. 
241. 
POINT II 
HARRIS' LIEN IS VALID THOUGH THE 
APARTMENT 'VAS NOT CONSTRUCTED. 
U.C.A., 1953 38-1-3, expressly provides that: 
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" * * * Licensed architects and engineers and 
artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, 
maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, 
surveys or superintendence or who have rendered 
other like professional service or bestowed labor 
shall have a lien upon the property upon or con-
cerning which they have rendered service, per-
formed labor or furnished materials." 
The statute does not require that a building must be 
constructed before such a lien attaches. And this court 
has held that the lien attaches when work or material 
has commenced on a structure, or preparatory thereto. 
Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Con-
struction Co., 18 U.2d 409, 424 P.2d 437. 
The Utah cases cited by Zions purporting to re-
quire the erection of a building, deal with cases where 
materials are supplied but not actually used at the build-
ing site. The legislature, has expressly concluded that 
an architect's services benefit the property, and the fact 
of the matter is that Harris has prepared a quarter of a 
million dollars worth of plans, specifications, engineer-
ing studies, soil studies, et cetera, which are tailor-made 
'to the property in question and which would cost an 
equal amount to reproduce for this property. In pre-
paring these plans, Harris has expended $90,000.00 of 
his own money, and while the plans were being prepared 
Zions received in excess of in rentals. 
Third party defendant cites an Iowa case which 
purports to hold that an architect had no lien when the 
building was not erected. See Foster v. Tierney, 59 
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N.,V. 56. The Iowa statute is entirely different, how-
ever, than the Utah statute in that first, an architect is 
not expressly given a lien, and secondly, the liens grant-
ed du not extend to the property upon or concerning 
which the service was rendered. More nearly in point is 
Larnoreaux v. Andersch, 150 N.W. 908 (Minn.), where 
the court held that the architect constructively contrib-
utes improvements to the land and is entitled to enforce 
his lien for plans and specifications prepared. This was 
so even though the Minnesota statute was the same as 
the Iowa statute. The court discusses the Foster case 
and points out that it is based upon a strict construction 
of the Iowa statute, Iowa being a strict construction 
state. Even in the Lanwreaux case, the statute did not 
expressly give an architect a lien. The Lamoreaux case 
also refers to Freernan v. Rinaker, 56 N.E. 1055 (Ill.), 
where the Illinois court upholds a lien to one who per-
forms services as an architect and validates the lien even 
though the building is not constructed. 
POINT III 
THE NOTICE OF INTENTION TO CLAIM 
A LIEN IS VALID WITHOUT REFERENCE 
TO HAROLD CARLSON. 
The court will recall that the architectural services 
were rendered by the joint venture of Harris and Carl-
son and that Carlson assigned all of his interest in the 
claim and the lien to Harris. U.C.A., 1953, Title 38-1-
26, expressly provides that all liens under the mechanic's 
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lien statute shall be assignable as other choses in action. 
Smoot v. Checketts, 44 Utah 211, 125 Pac. 412, held 
that the right to perfect a lien is also assignable. 
The fact that Carlson is not named in the notice of 
lien itself is indistinguishable from Buehner Block v. 
Glezos, 6 U.2d 226, 310 P.2d 51'7, where the owner 
charged with the lien was not named therein and the 
court held this omission was immaterial. 
POINT IV. 
THE NOTICE OF LIEN IS VALID DE-
SPITE TECHNICAL OBJECTIONS. 
The challenge to the lien's validity by reason of a 
purported lack of verification occurred for the first time 
on the morning of trial. Respondent vigorously objected 
to Zion's raising this issue belatedly. The answer to thG 
third party complaint filed a year and a half prior to the 
trial not only failed to affirmately plead this purported 
defense, but, in fact, admitted that the lien was prepared 
and filed by Harris, denying only that Zions was in-
debted to Harris by reason of any professional services 
rendered to Zions. 'Vhen Harris filed a supplemental 
complaint alleging the assignment from Carlson, Zions 
again filed its answer admitting the preparation and fil-
ing of the notice of claim of lien by Harris and in no way 
affirmatively alleging the invalidity of said notice by 
reason of lack of verification. By affirmative defense, 
Ziom alleged that the notice of lien was null and void 
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only because (a) Carlson was not a party to same, and 
( b) Zion!') Securities had not authorized the filing of 
same, and (c) no benefit had been conferred upon Zions 
Securities. 
The notice of lien in question was dated November 
16, 1965, and signed by Harris personally and acknowl-
edged before a notary public who duly affixed his sig-
uature and seal and thereupon was recorded in the office 
of the Salt Lake County Recorder. Suit was commenced 
upon the lien in June, 1966. Zions took the deposition 
of Harris in August of 1966, the deposition taking sev-
eral days, and at which deposition Harris, under oath, 
testified as to all of the essential elements of his lien and 
this cause of action. The deposition was followed by the 
deposition of Yarious personnel of Zions Securities. 
Zions Securities thereafter filed a motion for summary 
ju<lgment, at no time raising the issue of a purported 
]aek of yerification. The motion was denied. Thereafter, 
the matter came on for pre-trial hearing twice before the 
Third District Court, and at no time was the alleged de-
fense of lack of verification raised. 
Zions Securities has waived any purported defense 
of technical insufficiency of the lien by failing to raise 
same until the morning of trial. A failure to plead an 
affirmative defense results in a waiver of that defense 
and is excluded in the case, IA, Barron Holtzoff, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 279, p. 166. (Con-
struing Rule 8 ( c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
which is identical to the Utah rule.) Rule 8 ( c), U.R.-
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C.P. provides that a pleading shall set forth affirma-
tively any matter constituting an avoidance or affirma-
tive defense. A general denial will not permit proof of 
such matters not affirmatively alleged. The rule enum-
erates nineteen affirmative defenses most commonly in-
voked but is not limited to them. Other matters which 
have been held by the courts to constitute affirmative 
defenses which must be specially pleaded, for example, 
include insufficiency of a claim for a tax refund. North-
western National Bank v. U.S., 46 F. Supp. 390 (D.C. 
Minn., '42), affirmed 137 F.2d 761. Clearly, the claim 
that the notice of lien is insufficient constitutes an avoid-
ance requiring special affirmative pleading. 
A litigant waives any objection to want of or de-
fects in verification by failing to plead same. 41 Am. 
Jur., Pleading, Sec. 391, p. 562, Footnote 6; 71 CJS, 
Pleading, Sec. 556, p. 1120. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has repeatedly held 
that the notice of intention to claim a lien filed under 
the statute is no more nor less than simply that: A no-
tice. See Buehner Bloc/.,: vs. Glezos, supra, wherein the 
court states: 
"The purpose of the recordation of the notice 
of lien is to give notice thereof to all persons who 
may be affected thereby. * * * A further assault 
upon the lien by Hong that it was not effec-
tive against him nor his interest in the property 
because his name was not listed on the notice of 
lien is without merit." 
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The purpose of recording this document is to provide 
notice to those persons who. may be interested in said 
real property of the fact that the claimant thereunder 
asserts a claim against that real property. The notice 
filed herein complies not only substantially but exactly 
with the statutory requirements specifying the property, 
the owner, the claimant, the amount, the dates and all 
else required to adequately and fully apprise the world 
of the nature of Harris' claim. The one thing lacking, 
which Zions now claims renders this notice ineffective 
is a traditional verification. A traditional verification in 
no way amplifies nor clarifies the information contained 
in the body of the notice. The body of the notice is suffi-
cient to apprise any interested person of the nature of 
Harris' claim with or without the verification. 
Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 31, states 
that to "acknowledge" is: 
" * * * to own, avow or admit; to confess; to 
recognize one's acts and assume the responsibility 
therefor." 
Indeed, the requirement of verification is really nothing 
more than an archaic link with a highly formalized ap-
proach of the past and has been rejected in almost all 
legal procedure generally. The lien statute specifying 
the contents of the notice of claim practically in its pres-
ent form, was enacted in 1888, eight years before state-
hood. As stated in IA, Barron Holtzoff, ibid, § 333, 
p. 270, the trend of enlightened opinion is away from the 
all too barren formality of an oath to pleadings. As the 
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court is aware, the need for a wrification in formal 
pleadings filed in a court of law, which go well beyond 
merely the notice filed by Harris, has been abolished. 
In Tangren t 1• Snyder, 10 C.:2<l 95, 368 P.:!d 711, 
this court in construing the statute regarding filing 
of claims in probate proceedings, l,'.C.A., 1953, 75-9-.3, 
stated: 
''Respondent contends that the court was cor-
rect in dismissing the action with prejudice be-
cause courts in states haYing similar statutes hare 
held the requirements in the affidaYit to be man-
datory and haYe strictly construed them so that 
an on;ission or failure comply exactly with the 
literal wording of the statute was fatal to the 
presentment and upon rejection could not be the 
basis of a complaint thereon. (footnotes omitted! 
"'Ye are not in accord. "Te are of the opinion 
that the statutory requirements of the contents 
of the claim and affidaYit in support thereof 
should be liberalh- construed and that such stat-
utes were, as ap't°ty stated in Cnited States Fi-
delity Guaranf!J Co. t·. Keck, 75 Cal. App. 2<l 
828, 171P.2d731, 'not i11tended to make it easier 
to aYoid payment of a just claim, but were in-
tended to make a claimant set forth his claim with 
such particularity that the executor or adminis-
trator in passing upon it would be fully adYised 
as to .i us t what was claimed. * * *' " 
Zions. in its memorandum. cites authority from 
Kansas and X ew )fexico purporting to make mandatory 
the ,-erification of a lien notiee. Kansas. howeYer. con-
strues mechanic lien statutes as in derogation of the 
eommon law and hence strictly. D. J. Fair Lumber Co. 
'l'. Carlin, 430 P.2d 222 (Kan.). 
New .Mexico, faced with three different "verifica-
tion-acknowledgments" affixed to notice of liens de-
clared one of them to be invalid and two of them valid. 
See Lyons v. Howard, 117 Pac. 842 (N .. M.), where the 
court stated: 
''The courts of New .l\Iexico are committed to 
the doctrine that the mechanics lien law is re-
medial in its nature _and equitable in its enforce-
ment and is to be construed liberally. * * * It 
also follows in the absence of any statutory re-
quirement as to the form of the verification; that 
a substantial compliance therewith is all that is 
required. o particular form of verification is 
required by our statute nor is it specifically re-
quired thereby that the verification shall be true 
as to the knowledge of the affiant, nor is it nec-
essary that there should be an affidavit to the 
claim of lien. * * * The verification of a claim of 
lien is not for the purpose of proving the lien. 
The statement of the lien verified as required by 
law and recorded is a mere notice that the claim-
ant intends to avail himself of his right to a lien." 
See also Hot Springs Plumbing Co. v. Wallace, 27 P.2d 
98-i ( N where the "verification" reads as follows: 
"On this 6th day of August, 1930, before me 
personallv appeared J. E. Love, .Manager and 
one of th.e partners of said Love Lumber Com-
pany, to me known to be the person who executed 
the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that 
he executed the same as his free act and deed; 
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that the name of the owner, the name of the 
claimant, the description of the property upon 
which the Hen is claimed and the itemized state-
ment hereto attached are correct." 
The New Mexico court held the notice of lien to be suf-
ficient, and that any other interpretation would require 
a rule of strict construction. The New l\ilexico court in 
Home Plumbing Co. v. Pruitt, 372 P.2d 3'78 (N.M.), 
does not overrule the Hot Springs Plmnbing case, but, 
in fact, refers to it as "the law as thus announced." 
Other jurisdictions faced with this problem liberally 
construe the mechanic lien statutes and have uphel<l 
liens with a variety of technical insufficiencies. See 
Georgia Lumber v. Harrison Construction Co., 136 S.E. 
399 ('V.Va.) where the notary failed to affix his official 
seal to the jurat which was amended in that respect after 
the expiration of the time within which the notice was 
required to be given. See also Curry v. Morgan, 321 P. 
2d 973 (Okla.), where the notary's acknowledgment 
was defective and the court held that the defendants 
were not unable to determine the lien had been filed and 
the nature of the lien by reason of the defect and that 
there was substantial complance in the filing of the lien. 
See Peterman-Donnell,y Corp. v. First National Bank, 
408 P.2d 841, (Ariz.), where the lien notice failed to 
satisfy the statutory requirement of a "copy of the con-
tract," and the court validating same held the purpose 
of the statute is to give the property owner an oppor-
tunity to protect himself and time to investigate the 
claim and determine whether it is a proper charge. See 
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also Drake Lumber v. Lindquist, 170 P.2d 712 (Ore.), 
where the lien was ambiguous as to whether the claim 
was by Drake Lumber Company or C. V. Drake as an 
individual, and the court held the mechanic's and mate-
railmen's lien law is remedial in nature and should be 
liberally construed so as to afford laborers and material-
men the greatest protection compatible with justice and 
equity. See Stevenson v. Kilcheken Spruce Mills, Inc., 
412 P .2d 496 (Alaska), where the verification was typed 
in the classic manner but not signed by the claimant, 
aud the Alaska Court held the lack of the claimant's sig-
nature on the lien following the formal oath did not in-
validate the lien and that construing the statute as re-
medial and liberally, the claim of lien is not ineffective 
by reason of any insufficiency in the requirement for 
verif ica ti on. 
In Rust v. Kelley Brothers Lumber Co., 21 S.W. 
2d, 973 (Ark.), an itemized account attached to the 
lien under the Arkansas statute required verification and 
the court stated: 
"Although the itemized account attached to 
the complaint was not sworn to, the amount of 
materials furnished and the dates thereof were 
established by the evidence of appellee, and were 
not attempted to be contradicted. The record 
also shows that suit was commenced by appellee 
to establish its lien within 90 days after the ma-
terials were furnished, but it is insisted that ap-
pellee was not entitled to a lien, because it failed 
to verifv its account as required by section 6922 
of & Moses' Digest. This does not 
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make any difference. This court has uniformh 
held that, in an issue between mechanics or md-
terialmen and the owner of the property, a sub-
stantial compliance with the statute is all that 
necessary. The result is that the bringing of 11 
suit by the lien claimant against the owner gin 
the latter all the notice that could be required as 
to the claim for a lien against his property. The 
neglect to comply fully with the requirement of 
the statute was intended for the protection of 
third persons, who might acquire rights in or 
liens upon the same property. ]}I urray v. Rap-
ley, 30 Ark. 568; Anderson v. Seamans, 49 Ark. 
475, 5 S.,V. 799; 1lf.cFadden ·v. Stark, 58 Ark. 7, 
22 S."r· 884; Standard Lumber Co. v. TVilson, 
173 Ark. 1024, 296 S.\V. 27. In the last case the 
court said that the statute was wholly remedial in 
its nature, and that, when the controversy is be-
tween the holder of the lien and the owner of the 
land, an exact compliance with the statute at all 
points is not indispensable." 
See also, Robertson Lumber Co. v. Swenson, 138 
N.W. 684 (No. Da.) where the lien was not verifed and 
the court held that it did not affect its validity, and 
Patten and Davies Lumber Co. v. Hayden, 298 Pac. 
129 (Cal.) wherein the court held that failure to verify 
the lien did not forfeit the lien in absence of notice of 
the defect or demand for verification. 
The Utah Supreme Court, when faced with various 
insufficiencies of mechanic's lien notices, has consistently 
held the notices to be adequate. At the time of the first 
enactment of the territorial statute, the United States 
Supreme Court concluded that the Utah statute is to be 
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, liberally construed. See Flagstaff Silver Mining Co. v. 
Cullins, 104 U.S. 704, 26 L.ed 704 ( 1881). See Culmer 
v. C Zif t, 14 Utah 286, 47 Pac. 85, where the description 
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of the property sought to be charged was erroneous. See 
Park Cit.y Meat Co. v. Comstock Mining Co., 36 Utah 
145, 103 Pac. 254, involving an erroneous description of 
the property where the court states that the lien will not 
be defeated by mere technicalities or nice distinction. 
See Brnbaker v. Bennett, 19 Utah 401, 57 Pac. 170, 
dealing with an erroneous statement of the terms of the 
employment contract. See Garner v. Van Patten, 20 
Utah 342, 58 Pac. 684, dealing with errors and inconsist-
encies in the statement of the amount due. And see 
/!.,'cries Lumber Co. v. ]}Jartin, 31 Utah 241, 87 Pac. 713, 
dealing with a failure to apportion the amounts due with 
respect to two contracts. See also Buehner Block v. Gle-
--:os, supra, where the name of property owner was 
omitted. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite a myriad of technical objections raised by 
Zions Securities, it effectively authorized and ratified 
the architectural services rendered by Harris, which 
scrviees actually and constructively benefited Zions' real 
property and subjected same to Harris' lien, which lien 
has been established in open court to be valid and proper 
in all respects, and which entitles Harris to a judgment 
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of foreclosure with respect to the admitted indebtedness 
the lien secures. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
DELBERT 1\il. DRAPER JR. 
Draper, Sandack & Saperstein 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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